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JURY NULLIFICATION: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES*
Irwin A. Horowitz,t Norbert L. Kerr" & Keith E. Niedermeier"

INTRODUCTION

Juries have the implicit power to acquit defendants
despite evidence and judicial instructions to the contrary. The
jury's right to decide a criminal case by its own merits, without
fear of outside coercion and pressures, is a hallmark of AngloAmerican jurisprudence. The jury's nullification power has
become the subject of a resurgence of scholarly and popular
interest in recent years, partly as a response to a number of
high profile criminal trials. While jury nullification has more
support among legal academics' than judges, most legal
scholars strongly oppose the jury's exercise of its nullification
power.'
Theas vast
majority
of case
law in
also
condemns
3 Indeed,
nullification
lawless
and arbitrary.
a recent
case,
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AKHIL REED AmAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

110 (1998).

Robert F. Schopp, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and Necessity as
Jury Responses to Crimes of Conscience, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2039, 2041-42 (1996);
Richard R. St. John, License to Nullify: The Democratic and ConstitutionalDeficiencies
ofAuthorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563, 2563-64 (1997).
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
2
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the Second Circuit emphasized that nullification is a violation
of a juror's oath to apply the law as instructed by the court
While the judiciary as a general rule does not sanction
the nullification power of the jury, some jurists tacitly
recognize the jury's right to nullify by allowing defendants to
testify about moral values and intent, but remain unwilling to
directly inform jurors of their nullification powers.5 Indeed,
Americans have historically displayed "bipolar" attitudes
toward jury nullification.' The use of the term bipolar signifies
not only that proponents and opponents are diametrically
opposed, but also, like the affective bipolar disorder it
bespeaks, the controversy is heated and emotional.7
The purpose of this Article is to inform this debate.
This Article will begin by exploring what is meant by the term
"nullification." It then will briefly review the legal history of
jury nullification. However, this Article's primary tasks will be
to pose a number of empirical questions relevant to the legal
debate on nullification, to provide a selective review of the
empirical research bearing on these questions (with an
emphasis on some of our own research on this topic), and
finally, to identify open empirical questions needing further
research.
I.

DEFINING JURY NULLIFICATION

Nullification occurs when a jury disregards or
misapplies the law in reaching its verdict.8 Nullification
proponents argue that the primary motive for such action
should be to return an acquittal when strict interpretation of
the law would result in an injustice and violate the moral
conscience of the community.9 Henceforth, this Article will use
the term "conventional nullification" to refer to nullification so
4 United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1997).

Donald C. Dilworth, Jury Nullification: When Jurors Leave the Law
Behind, TRIAL, May 1996, at 79.
Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views of Jury Power,
15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 165 (1991).
7
s

Id.
Id. at 167.

" Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 168, 169 (1972).
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motivated. Such perceived injustice can arise from various
concerns. One is that the defendant's behavior, while
technically illegal, was justified to some degree. Jurors may
apply a "reasonable man" standard and justify a defendant's
behavior, feeling that any reasonable person (including
themselves, perhaps) would have acted similarly under the
circumstances."0 Or, jurors may reason that the defendant was
not a free agent but acted under compulsion or diminished
capacity (e.g., Inside the Jury Room11 ). Or, jurors may conclude
that a defendant's actions were prompted by admirable motives
or intentions (in some cases of euthanasia or doctor assisted
suicide). 2 Even if jurors do not see a defendant's behavior as
justified, they could nullify because they believe that the
penalty prescribed by law is disproportionate to the offense,
either because the usual penalty is seen as too severe or
because the defendant has "already suffered enough." 3
Exercise of the nullification power permits the jury to
be merciful. Alan Scheflin has suggested that nullification
power does not abrogate statutes or precedents (thereby
creating new law), but rather it "perfects" the application of
current law by adding a much needed touch of mercy. 4 The
power of juries to nullify tends to emerge as a political issue
during times of national discontent. 5 The nullification doctrine
has struck a resonant chord in the community as evidenced by
the existence of grass roots organizations whose aims are to
amend state constitutions6 to permit juries to be fully informed
of their power to nullify.
Nullification can also be motivated by jurors' rejection
of the law itself, rather than by concern for the fate of
particular defendants. For example, jurors may feel that the
behavior in question should not be illegal. An historic example
is the unwillingness of Prohibition-era jurors to convict
'0

NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMIONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE

LAW 32 (1995).
" See, e.g., Frontline:Inside the Jury Room (WGBH broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986).
See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
12 See FINKEL, supra note 10, at 44.
"
14

Horowitz & Willging, supranote 6, at 162.
See AMAR, supranote 1.

"' See generally J.P. Levine, The Legislative Role of Juries, BAR FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 605 (1984).
" See infra note 20.
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defendants charged with selling liquor." More contemporary
examples might be cases in which the law prohibits some
private sexual behavior of consenting adults or the use of
certain "soft" illegal drugs. 8 Or, jurors may have some moral
objection to a law. For example, some jurors might see laws
that prohibit blocking entrances to abortion clinics as
countenancing legalized murder.
Critics of nullification note that jurors' motives need
not be so principled; nullification may also occur because of
caprice or unprincipled favoritism. An example of the latter is
the apparent refusal of southern juries to convict white
defendants charged with offenses against black victims despite
very strong prosecution cases. 9 Yet another dark side of
nullification can be termed jury vilification. Juries may return
verdicts that reflect prejudiced or bigoted community
standards and convict when the evidence does not warrant a
conviction. Examples of jury vilification may be found
throughout American history but are most prominent in the
racially charged history of the former states of the
confederacy." The opponents of the nullification power have
pilloried the doctrine as historically unsound, functionally
unwise, and legally untenable. Gary Simson takes the position
that the difference between vengeance and mercy is an

17

Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a

Controversy,43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 52, 78 (1980).
'8 PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME
144 (1995).
9 See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE
IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 111-12 (1994); W. William Hodes, Lord Brouham, the Dream
Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075, 1090, 109697 (1996).
20 Clay Conrad, a strong defender of jury independence, argues
that these
miscarriages of justice were less the fault of the jury than the actions of prosecutors,
judges, and governors who were complicit in establishing a justice system that
distorted and eviscerated the rights of black defendants. See CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY
NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 167-205 (1998). Although jury
vilification based upon race has occurred and likely will occur in the future, Conrad
concludes that the extant evidence does not suggest that the jury is any more racist
than other participants in the criminal justice system, such as prosecutors, judges,
police, and attorneys. Id. at 196-201. Some suggest that instances of unalloyed racist
nullification are extremely rare and these low numbers can be further reduced without
affecting the jury's power to nullify in an appropriate case. Id. at 191.
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unprincipled distinction and while nullification may have had
some legal basis in colonial days, it is now a legal
anachronism.21
At times, jurors may disregard or misapply the law to
meet somewhat broader goals than producing a preferred trial
outcome for a particular defendant. An acquittal may be
intended to voice a protest against some agency or public
policy. For example, many media personalities have suggested
that the verdict in the O.J. Simpson murder trial might have
been, in part, an indictment of racism in the Los Angeles police
department.2 2 Jurors may also nullify the law to meet very
general justice goals. So, for example, some have urged juries
to combat racism in the criminal justice system by acquitting
minority defendants even when the necessary elements of the
charge have appeared to be proven against a specific minority
defendant.'
There is yet another, less conventional form of
nullification that this Article will consider. It occurs when
jurors fail to follow some normative, legal prescription and
alter their verdict because of the resultant bias. This action is
called "nullification via juror bias." The prescription in
question need not be a particular statute under which a
defendant is charged, as the preceding, conventional views of
nullification assume. Rather, any rule or instruction that
proscribes jurors' selection and evaluation of information could
be the locus of such nullification via juror bias. This could
include rules of evidence, exclusionary instructions, or
standards or burdens of proof. What is crucial in such acts of
nullification is the biased use of information. Although in some
contexts (such as in assigning culpability; in identifying
remedies), it may be important to distinguish between willful
refusals to follow the law and unintentional failures to do so, in
terms of the net effect for trial outcome, it is not useful to draw
21 Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical

View, 54 TEX. L. REV. 488, 493 (1976).
See Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits: O.J. Simpson, Critical Race
Theory, The Law and the Triumph of Color in America, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at
27; Robert Marquand & Daniel B. Wood, Lessons Drawn from Simpson in Black, White,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 5, 1995, at 1.
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
CriminalJustice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995).
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such a distinction. Thus, this Article will consider juror bias
arising both from unwillingness and inability to follow the
law's prescriptions as types of nullification. In contrast to
conventional nullification, some such instances of nullification
via bias may even occur without conscious awareness.
Such juror bias may take many forms.' One form is
when jurors are either unwilling or unable to disregardcertain
information. 5 Familiar examples would include jurors' failure
to disregard evidence heard but subsequently ruled as
inadmissible, or jurors' consideration of proscribed pretrial
publicity. 2 Another form occurs when jurors are unwilling or
unable to limit their use of certain information. Examples
would include using knowledge of a defendant's prior criminal
record to infer culpability (rather than just as a source of
credibility information) or taking the content of opening/closing
arguments as evidence (rather than just as each side's theory
of the case). Yet another form of bias consists of the inability
or unwillingness to consider certain information.' Examples
would be a failure to consider the well-reasoned arguments of
opposing jurors during deliberation or a failure to consider
evidence contrary to one's initially preferred verdict.2 9
Another broad class of juror biases arise when jurors
rely upon legally-proscribed pre-existing beliefs. Racial or
gender stereotypes which are treated as probative illustrate
such biases. And a final type of juror bias arises from jurors'
feelings about parties in the trial (e.g., defendant, victim,
attorney). This Article is concerned with the impact of jurors'
feelings (of sympathy or of aversion) on biasing jurors'
interpretation, evaluation, and weighing of information at
trial.

24

Reid Hastie & Kennith Rasinski, The Concept of Accuracy in Social

Judgment, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 212 (A. R. Kruglanski & D.

Bar-Tal eds., 1988).
Hastie & Rasinski, supranote 24, at 117.
26 Id. at 118.
27 Id. at 134.
28 Id.
2

Id. at 137.
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A BRIEF LEGAL HISTORY OF JURY NULLIFICATION

Although scholars have been debating the precise
scope and the constitutional roots of jury nullification for years,
the origins of this power are obscure. Indeed, the use of the
term "jury nullification" is curious. It suggests that the jury is
itself nullified. 0 What the term usually refers to, of course, is
when a jury exercises its independence and acquits in the face
of the evidence and the law. Nancy King notes that both the
Constitution and the ratification debates are silent on the
nullification issue.3' Additionally, Andrew Leipold argues that
there is little evidence that the Framers were concerned with
the issue of jury nullification." However, he does admit that
the lack of overt concern may mean that the power to nullify
was simply assumed and therefore no discussion was
required. 33 Furthermore, Akhil Reed Amar is persuasive in
claiming that the Constitution was originally understood as
preserving the jury's right to refuse to follow a law it deemed
unconstitutional.3 4
Historically, the nullification power of the jury may be
traced to Bushel's Case35 (sometimes Bushell or Bushnell),
which occurred following the 1670 English trial of William
Penn and William Mead. Penn and Mead were acquitted of a
charge of preaching to an unlawful assembly." In spite of their
manifest guilt, the jury refused to convict because the
defendants had been brought to trial on purely political
grounds. The Court of Common Pleas supported the jury's
power to acquit and gave the jury ultimate control over the
facts at issue. The opinion also suggested that jurors may rely,
in part, on their own consciences when rendering a decision.3 8

CONRAD, supra note 20, at 6.
J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and

31 Nancy

Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. Cm. L. REV. 433, 444 (1998).
32 Andrew A. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 289
(1996).

" Id.
AMAR, supra note 1, at 98.
31 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
36 Id. at 1009.

37 CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 361-62 (1980).
38 Id. at 362.
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American colonials carried the notion of nullification
with them to North America and the power of the jury to
nullify unpopular laws was an important ingredient of the
colonial experience." Colonial juries acted as a bulwark against
unpopular laws and hostile Crown-appointed judges. The
power of the jury in criminal trials in the first decades
following the constitutional convention appears to have been
untrammeled. Rules of evidence were either loose or
nonexistent and the control of the judge over courtroom
procedure was apparently limited to preventing mayhem." D.
Marie Provine has shown that the jury was given such powers
because very little distinguished the lay jurors from the equally
lay judge.41 However, Justice Story promulgated a new, more
circumscribed view of jury power in United States v. Battiste.42
He conceded the "physical power to disregard the law as laid
down to them by the court," but Justice Story did not think the
jury should follow its whims and interpret the law on its own."
Justice Story's concern in this instance was to ensure that
juries would not punish a defendant deserving a merciful
judgment." Modern proponents of the jury's power to nullify
are in accord with Justice Story. They would limit nullification
to a jury's ability to render a merciful verdict.4' However, as
this Article has noted, vindictive nullification or vilification is
the other, dark side of the nullification coin.
Justice Story's opinion initiated a judicial revolt
against the unencumbered power of the jury. This revolt moved
with fits and starts. Trials arising out of the 1850 Fugitive
Slave Act led to a definitive exercise of jury independence.46
Nullification became a direct issue in those cases when
defendants appealed to the juries to nullify the law.
39 Mark DeWolf Howe, Juries as Judges of CriminalLaw, 52 HARV. L. REV.
582, 584 (1939).
40

id.

41 D. MARIE PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NONLAWYER JUDGES AND
THE

POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM 3 (1986).
42 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835), (No.14,545).
43 Id. at 1046.
44 Howe, supra note 39, at 589-90.
45 See AMAR,supra note
1.
46 CONRAD, supra note 20, at
88.
47Id.
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during the
Defendants would again appeal for nullification
48
Vietnam War period "draft-dodging" trials.
However, a number of state cases limiting the jury's
power eventually culminated in the only U.S. Supreme Court
case that has dealt with the jury's power to nullify: Sparf and
Hansen v. United States.49 This 1895 case proscribed much of
the jury's explicit power and authority by holding that the
jury's obligation was to follow the law as received from the
court and to apply that law to the facts. 50 Writing for the
majority, Justice Harlan argued that the obligation of the
criminal jury was to apply the law as rendered by the trial
court."' The most recent cases in both Federal and state courts
show that Sparf and Hansen has been universally followed.52
In United States v. Dougherty,5 the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit debated at length the
wisdom and origin of the nullification power and the right of
the jury to be informed of this power. Dougherty evolved out of
the protests of the Vietnam War and concerned the request by
the defense to permit a nullification instruction to the jury by
the trial court.5 4 The trial judge turned down the request and
the D.C. Circuit upheld that ruling by a 2-1 margin.55
The modern debate as to the limits of the jury's power
was most clearly described in Dougherty. Judge Leventhal,
writing for the majority of the D.C. Court of Appeals, while
noting that the pages of history are replete with shining
examples of juries that refused to convict virtuous defendants,
nevertheless suggested that if juries were given explicit
nullification instructions, their behavior would be anarchic. 5
(Hereafter, this Article will refer to this as the "chaos"
hypothesis). Furthermore, an explicit declaration of the jury's
power to nullify would, in Judge Leventhal's view, burden the
jury enormously and unfairly because each jury would be in the
418See

Horowitz & Willging, supranote 6, at 174.

49 156 U.S. 51 (1895).

'0 Id. at 106.
01 Id.
82

See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).

88

473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1120, 1130-37.
Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1133.
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position of "fashion[ing] the [law]."5 7 Judge Leventhal would
not inform juries of the power to nullify, a power that he
explicitly believes the jury possesses.5 8 Judge Bazelon, writing
for the minority in Dougherty, did not believe that juries would
make "rampantly abusive use of their power."59 He suggested
that trust in the jury is, in fact, a core tenet of our legal
system.0 While Judge Bazelon anticipated some abuse of
nullification instructions if the court issued them, he
hypothesized that juries would not exercise their power if the
defendant seemed truly dangerous.61 The judges in Dougherty
were clearly cognizant of the history of the nullification issue.
Judge Leventhal praised the nullifying decisions of juries
which furthered the cause of liberty in such cases as seditious
63
libel (John Peter Zenger's62 trial) and the Fugitive Slave Act
trials." He also noted the colonial recognition of an explicit
right of nullification. 5 Acknowledgment of the utility of its
nullification power did not lead, however, to a concession that
the jury ought to be explicitly informed of this power. To do so
would, in the majority's opinion, lead to chaos in the courts.66
What is "chaos" from a legal standpoint? Judge
Leventhal, writing for the majority in Dougherty, did not define
the term but instead offered an analogy. He suggested that a
speed limit of sixty-five often produced actual speeds in excess
of the limit.67 Drivers know that they may be able to exceed the
limit without prejudice. But, if the limit was raised to the
speed at which motorists actually drive, say seventy-five, then
the tolerance factor would have to be raised as well, and a
slippery slope would manifest.68 Judge Leventhal analogized
that juries "know" they may return a verdict that may not
follow the law, but to inform them directly that they may do so,

"
10

Id. at 1136.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1136.

9 Id. at 1142 (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

60

Id.

61 Id. at 1143.
62

See infra note 89.

G3 9

Stat. 462 (1850).
Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130.

6' Id. at 1132.
66 Id. at 1133.
67

Id. at 1134.

68 Id.
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would encourage unacceptable departures from the law,
reflecting jurors' use of bias, prejudice, or sympathy. 9 Thus,
the court endorsed a rather curious doctrine. Juries can (and
sometimes should) do what they wish, even if it runs counter to
the law. But to prevent misuse of this power, juries must not
be told that they possess such power. To the contrary, they
should be instructed that they must always follow the letter of
the law."0 That is, in Judge Leventhal's opinion, juries do not
have the express right to nullify. They simply have the power
to do so because reprisals against juries did not survive the test
of history.7 '
The history of nullification in criminal trials is not
mirrored in the civil court. The primary difference is that the
judiciary attempted to curb the civil jury's nullification power
from the very start of the constitutional period in 1789. The
civil jury was neither part of the Magna Carta nor a persistent
concern of the constitutions of the colonies. 2 It was, therefore,
not as encrusted in early mythology as was the criminal jury.
On the criminal jury side, one may argue that the jury's
primary purpose is to give the stamp of popular legitimacy to
outcomes of criminal cases.
However, solicitude for the civil jury historically resided
in the self-interested desire of various interests for protection
from foreclosures and other loss of property or liberty as a
result of a failure to pay debts. Unlike the early juries in
criminal trials, civil juries did not have unrestrained power.
British judges effectively controlled juries by removing certain
cases from them, reviewing their decisions, or guiding their
decisions. 3 Juries were excluded from equity and admiralty
cases. 4 Indeed, one of the concerns of the anti-federalists was
the lack of a jury in such cases. After all, colonial juries
nullified the enforcement of unpopular British trade laws by
acquitting smugglers and punished the British naval officers

C9 Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1034-37.
70

7'
72

Id.
Id. at 1136

R.A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 18 (1962).

73 Robert W. Kirst, The Jury's HistoricDomain in Complex Cases, 58 WASH.

L. REV. 1, 14-17 (1982).
74 Id. at 17.
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by imposing civil liability.7" The British evaded this
nullification tactic by the simple expediency of bringing such
cases in admiralty courts. 6 Despite this history, the Seventh
Amendment, as enacted, permitted the continuation of this
evasive practice by guaranteeing civil trial by jury only in
"[s]uits at common law."77
The current debate, which primarily concerns the use
and competence of the civil jury in complex cases, is not novel.
In fact, the Industrial Revolution caused an explosive growth of
tort law after 1850, and the popular consensus was that not
only would lawsuits involving machinery be too complex for the
layman, but that whatever the evidence, juries would
sympathize with the mangled plaintiffs against the giant
corporations.78 Corporations felt that juries were resolutely in
favor of plaintiffs and would stretch the law to that end.79
While research shows that individuals may process
evidence in a biased manner to reach desired conclusions," it is
at least possible that when individuals function in a group
setting, the group may correct or mitigate these biases."
Michael Saks suggests that groups are less susceptible to bias
because discussion allows members to work through
misunderstandings and clarify issues that initially may have
been ignored.82 Unfortunately, reviews of the full empirical
literature do not indicate that juries are less susceptible to
biasing factors than individual jurors.83 And a recent study
designed specifically to explore this question confirmed that
unless conviction rates were extreme (i.e., near zero percent or

"' Id. at 18.
76 Id.
77 AMAR, supra note 1, at 147.
7" LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 220-21 (2d ed.
1985).

79 Id. at 221.
"' K. Sommer et al., When Juries Fail to Comply with the Law: Biased
Evidence Processing in Individual and Group Decision Making, 27 PERSONALITY AND
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 309, 317 (2001).
01

Id.

02

Michael J. Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the Greaterthe Unpredictability,79

JUDICATURE 263, 264 (1996).
W Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and
Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687-719 (1996) [hereinafter Kerr et al., Bias].
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one hundred percent), biases exhibited by individual jurors
tend to be even more pronounced among deliberating juries."
While the jury in criminal trials is relatively
unfettered, the same cannot be said of juries in civil trials.
Judges have at their disposal a variety of procedural
constraints that function to limit the civil jury's discretionary
powers. In a federal civil case, the judge can instruct the jury
to return a special verdict, in which the court submits a form to
the jury that requires the jury to make written findings of
fact.8 5 The court then enters judgment based on the jury's
findings of fact. Another procedural device available to a judge
in a federal civil case is to ask the jury to answer written
interrogatories as well as to reach a general verdict.86 In this
way, the judge helps to structure the reasoning process that
leads the jury to its verdict. Each of these methods is a means
for the judge to limit the civil jury's opportunity to reach a
verdict contrary to what the judge views as correct. However,
judges tend to be fairly circumspect about using special
verdicts and interrogatories, perhaps because they are worried
about invading the jury's province. Thus, even in the civil
context, juries usually return general verdicts. In addition, in a
civil case, juries are often asked to assess general as well as
punitive damages. These damage assessments are another
means, as Nancy Marder observes, through which juries can
give expression to their interpretation of a case."
Given the distinctly different roles played by juries in
criminal and civil trials, the application of the term "jury
nullification" to civil trials is problematic. For example, while
criminal juries' decisions can usually be thought of as
categorical, right-or-wrong judgments, the quality of civil jury
decisions are often more a matter of goodness of fit to some
continuous, vaguely specified criterion (e.g., suitable punitive

Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Jurors vs. Juries:New Evidence from the
SDS Perspective, 80 ORG. BEHAV. & Htmi. DECISION PROCESSES 70, 73 (1999).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (Special Verdicts).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b) (General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to
Interrogatories).
Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. Rev. 877,
915 (1999).
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damages). There are, in essence, few if any circumstances in
which the decision of a civil jury is definitive and
unimpeachable.
The criminal jury's verdict, as well as its decisionmaking process, is entirely opaque, which enhances the jury's
capacity to return a verdict according to conscience,-a verdict
that could fly in the face of both the law and the facts. The
general verdict and the Fifth Amendment injunction against
double jeopardy undergird the criminal jury's independence.
This Article posits that if civil jurors perceived that a potential
outcome was unfair, or the rules under which they were
required to reach a decision were deemed unfair, the group
might alter the judgments of fault, or the degree of fault
assigned to the parties, in order to produce a just outcome. This
is not precisely nullification, but it certainly is noncompliance.
Research evidence confirming this suspicion is reviewed below.

EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS BEARING ON JURY

III.

NULLIFICATION

Question 1: Does Conventional Jury Nullification
Occur?

A.

As noted earlier, "conventional" nullification refers to
those instances where the jury's disregard of the law is
motivated by concerns with achieving a more just outcome
than would occur under the strict application of the law. There
is considerable non-experimental evidence that conventional
nullification does achieve a more just outcome. Best known, of
course, are classic case studies of historically important
instances of nullification, such as the Bushel"' and Zenger 9
cases. In each such case, there was unambiguous and strong
evidence of the defendants' guilt under the then-current law,
88

124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).

The Trial of Mr. John Peter Zenger, 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 675
(London 1735); see also STANLEY N. KATZ, Introduction to JAMEs ALEXANDER, A BRIEF
NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 3-5 (Stanley N. Katz ed.,
1963).
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widespread public opposition to the defendants' conviction, and
an eventual jury acquittal." Reasonable inferences of
conventional nullification have also been drawn from low
conviction rates for particularly unpopular statutes (e.g.,
violations of Prohibition, Fugitive Slave Act in the Northern

states).91
Other, somewhat more direct evidence comes from
reports of juror behavior during trials or in post-deliberation
interviews. For instance, a clear example of nullification was
provided by the documentary program Inside the Jury Room,92
which included (with all parties' permission) a video-recording
of an actual jury deliberation for an unlawful possession of a
weapon case. The jurors' rationale for acquittal clearly
reflected appeal to extenuating circumstances (e.g., the
defendant's
diminished mental capacity) unprovided for in the
93
law.
Another line of evidence comes from geographic
disparities in acquittal rates that cannot be plausibly
attributed to geographic differences in applicable law or trial
evidence (e.g., acquittals of black defendants in the Bronx94 ).95
There is also corroborative experimental evidence. For
example, experimental jury simulation studies show that as
the severity of a prescribed penalty increases (especially to
extremely harsh levels), the probability of criminal conviction
" REMBAR, supranote 37, at 195; KATZ, supra note 89 at 3-5.
"Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHi. LAW REv. 867, 890-91; see also Scheflin & Van
Dyke, supra note 17, at 102.
92 Frontline,supra note
11.
03 Id.
' Benjamin A. Holden et al., Racism on Trial, MONTREAL GAZETrE, Oct. 7,
1995, at B1.
's According to Nancy Marder, supra note 87, at 911, there is a contentious
debate about the acquittal rates of Bronx juries. Some commentators suggest that the
"Bronx" juries are not acquitting at unusually high rates, but are somewhat higher
than expected. For example, Roger Parloff, Race and Juries:If itAin't Broke, A.B.A. J.,
5-6 (1997), divulges that the acquittal rate for jury trials in the Bronx of black
defendants charged with felonies was 43.6% in 1995 and 39.1% in 1996. Others claim
that Bronx juries acquit at a rate significantly higher than the national acquittal rate.
However, the reasons for the discrepant acquittal rates are unclear. The implication, of
course, is that this is an example of race-based nullification. Such a conclusion is at
least premature and certainly unwarranted. Juror's perceptions of police and
prosecutorial behavior, the type of crimes, the nature of the defendants, are all
potential causal factors yet to be examined in an empirically coherent manner.
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declines and a higher standard of proof may be applied by
jurors." For instance, in a recent study Niedermeier, Horowitz,
and Kerr reported an experiment in which a physician was
accused of knowingly transfusing a patient with blood
unscreened for the HIV virus." Although the charges, elements
necessary for conviction, evidence, and prescribed standards of
proof were held constant, they found that the mock jurors were
less likely to judge the physician as guilty of violating the law
when the penalty prescribed by law was severe (twenty-five
years of imprisonment) than when it was relatively mild ($500
fine).98
In a series of studies on the civil jury, Sommer,
Horowitz, and Bourgeous sought to determine whether the
application of unfair negligence rules would bias the decisionmaking strategies of (1) jurors and (2) juries.9 The possibility
that juries may recruit information to reach a desired rather
than an objective result fits a small but growing body of
literature suggesting that groups are as vulnerable to
systematic judgmental biases as are individual decision
makers.'
The goal of the research summarized above was to
examine, first at the individual and then at the group level,
how decision makers use information when the decision
criteria support results that may conflict with desires to reach
outcomes that are perceived as fair, just, or equitable."' To put
it another way, the research was directed toward situations in
which distributive justice norms were violated by the
stipulated decision criteria. 2 Previous research suggested that
when people believe that their decisions may result in unfair
(e.g., overly punitive) outcomes for others, these decision
96 Norbert L. Kerr, Severity of Penalty and Mock Jurors' Verdicts, 36 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1431, 1432 (1978).
97 See generally Keith E. Niedermeier et al., Informing Jurors
of their
Nullification Power: A Route to a Just Verdict or Judicial Chaos?, 23 LAW & HU.
BEHAV. 313 (1999).
See infra Figure 1.
Sommer et al., supranote 80, at 331.
'00 See generally D. Gigone & Reid Hastie, The Impact of Informationon Small
Group Choice, 72 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 132-40 (1997); Kerr et al., Bias,
supra,note 83.
10' Sommer et al., supra note 80, at 311-13.
102

Id. at 313.
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Figure 1: Effects of Severity of Penalty on Mock Juror Verdict*
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makers may augment the importance of information leading to
particular (i.e., fair) conclusions. °3 In a similar vein, the group
research on judgmental tasks finds that groups give
disproportional attention to evidence supporting desired and
commonly shared decision alternatives.1 " Sommer, Horowitz,
and Bourgeous examined the hypothesis that individuals and
groups that experience conflict between legally constrained
outcomes versus morally fair judgments recruit information in
a manner that will enhance distributive justice outcomes.0 '
Shari Diamond notes that while civil juries are often
"blindfolded"-denied information such as whether the
defendant carries liability insurance-the various negligence
standards applicable in tort trials (strict liability, contributory
and comparative negligence) are outcome-determinative legal
0
rules whose fairness jurors may question."
Yet, central to a
finding of negligence are attributions of blame and
responsibility, and the comparative negligence standard
requires that blame be apportioned and that monetary awards
follow precisely that apportionment. However, the court does
not inform jurors that if the plaintiff sustains some of the
blame, no award will be given. Under a contributory negligence
standard, any blame attached to the plaintiff may entirely bar
an award. Legal scholars have long speculated on the tendency
for juries to mete out distributive justice-based verdicts by
eliding or ignoring the mandated rule.0 7
Sommer, Horowitz, and Bourgeous based their study
on a hypothetical case in which the defendant clearly bore
some responsibility for an injury and the plaintiff also bore
responsibility." 8 A husband sues an auto maker for one million
dollars for his wife's accidental death."° The immediate and
undisputed cause of death was a defective fuel filter that led to
an explosion (the defendant is blameworthy).1" On the other
hand, the auto maker had identified the design flaw in the
103
104

Id. at 314.
Kerr et al., Bias, supra note 83, at 77

'05 Sommer et al., supranote 80, at 310.
106 Shari S. Diamond et al., Blindfolding the Jury, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS
252, 252-54 (1989).
107 Id. at 253.
'" See Sommer et al., supra note 80, at 315.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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filter long before the accident, had recalled the car, and had
repeatedly but futilely attempted to contact the defendant to
try to get the part replaced (the plaintiff is blameworthy)."'
The rule prescribed by the trial judge for assigning fault and/or
setting a damage award was then systematically varied.1 12 The
control condition imposed the comparative negligence rule.'
Under this rule, damage awards to the plaintiff were to be
reduced to the degree that the plaintiff was blameworthy."'
Direct assessments under this rule indicated that, on average,
mock juries felt that the plaintiff bore about forty percent of
the blame."5
This condition was contrasted with two others. In one,
were instructed to follow a contributory negligence
jurors
mock
rule, under which no damages may be awarded to the plaintiff
if the plaintiff is at all blameworthy."6 A separate sample of
respondents indicated that this rule was less fair than the
baseline, comparative negligence rule."' It was seen as unfair
to preclude an injured party from receiving any compensation
for his or her injury because that party may have contributed
in some, perhaps very small way to that victimization." 8 Under
the contributory negligence rule, the only way the jurors could
insure what they viewed as a fair outcome (i.e., some
compensation to the plaintiff) was to minimize the
blameworthiness of the plaintiff."9
As shown in Figure 2a, Sommer, Horowitz, and
Bourgeous' mock jurors did blame the plaintiff less under the
contributory negligence rule (on average, the plaintiff was
judged to be twenty-six percent responsible for the accident)
than under the comparative negligence rule (plaintiff forty
percent to blame)."2' Another, even clearer way of showing that
this involved nullification is to examine how many juries
reported that the plaintiff was wholly blameless (which must
. Id. at 316.
112 Id. at 316.
'" Sommer et al., supranote 80, at 317.
114

Id.

15 Id.
116 Id.
17 Id.
18

Sommer et al., supra note 80, at 317.

n9 Id. at 318.
120

Id. at 319.
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Figure 2a: Negligence Rule and Mock Jury Judgments of
Plaintiff Responsibility*

0

0

4-0

U)

0

C)

lll]]]l o-0"
0)

00

0

i

LO

,T

I
0
LO
,su)

-t
0

0

LO

4s

0

LO)

CNv1r

0

fq!l~qjsuodseuE!1PU~eld %
* Sommer et al., supra note 80 (Experiment
2).

LO

0

2001]

JURY NULLIFICATION

1227

be the case to award any damages under the contributory
negligence rule). As Figure 2b shows, under the comparative
negligence rule, which did not interfere with what the jurors
viewed as a fair outcome, none of the mock juries reported that
the plaintiff was blameless. 2' 1 However, under the contributory
negligence rule, rather than strictly applying the rule and,
consequently, never making an award to the plaintiff, nearly
half (forty-five percent) of the mock juries nullified the rule by
simply judging the blameworthy plaintiff to be blameless.
122
Sommer and colleagues termed these juries noncompliant.
They also found that during jury deliberations,
noncompliant (as opposed to compliant) juries tended to focus
on evidence that justified their noncompliance with the law,
and to ignore evidence that would make such noncompliance
more difficult.'2 An interesting finding was that jury
noncompliance nearly always involved a so-called "trigger"
juror who explicitly articulated the unfairness of the rule
during deliberations." Even the remaining, compliant juries
(i.e., those that conceded that the plaintiff bore some of the
blame) bent the law. Over half (fifty-five percent) still
nullified-i.e., they awarded damages to a blameworthy
plaintiff, contrary to the contributory negligence rule.'2
The same pattern was observed for individual mock
jurors in another experiment. 26 Sommer, Horowitz, and
Bourgeous reported comparable but opposite results when the
rule was seen as unfairly benefiting the plaintiff-such as the
strict negligence rule, which required awarding full damages if
the defendant bore any blame whatsoever. 2" Thus, Sommer
and colleagues nicely demonstrate that when rules for
assigning fault and/or setting a damage award are seen as
unfair, jurors may nullify these rules by "bending" them.

121
122

Id. at 320.
Id.

123 Sommer et al., supra note 80, at 321.
124

Id.

'2 Id. at 322; see also Figure 2.
12GSee Figure 2c.
'2 Sommer et al., supra note 80, at 324.
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Figure 2b: Negligence Rule and Judgments of No Plaintiff
Responsibility*
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Figure 2c: Negligence Rule and Percent of Nullifying Jurors
and Juries*
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Juries are often deprived of information that courts
think will bias the juries' decisions. This is especially true in
civil trials. 128 The blindfold is applied to juries to ensure that
juries follow legislative intent. However, a substantial number
of juries in Sommer, Horowitz, and Bourgeous' research did not
follow legislative intent. The noncompliant juries uniformly
moved in the direction that would be predicted by the norms of
distributive justice. Further, a large number of jurors and
juries explicitly nullified the law by rendering damages
inconsistent with the judge's instructions.
While juries are often blindfolded as to the
consequences of their verdicts in negligence cases, eight states
have passed legislation that permit juries to be informed about
the consequence of their negligence determinations.'2 9 Several
other states have reached the same result via judicial
decision.!3 Sommer, Horowitz, and Bourgeous' results suggest
that, in the absence of a blindfold, juries prefer the
comparative negligence rule; in both the strict liability and
contributory negligence conditions, a significant portion of the
juries violated the legislative intent of the negligence rules.
B.

Question 2: Does Jury Nullification Via JurorBias
Occur?

Of course, there is considerable anecdotal evidence
that jurors and juries exhibit extralegal biases which
functionally nullify the law. There is also a large and varied
body of corroborative experimental evidence.13' Examples
2
include jurors' proscribed use of prejudicial pretrial publicity
and proscribed, inadmissible evidence. There is also research
evidence suggesting that sometimes jurors disregard the law
because they see the law (such as the laws of evidence) as
'2

Diamond et al, supranote 106, at 253

12 See infra note 130.
130 Noel Fidel, Pre-eminently a PoliticalInstitution:the Right ofArizona Juries

to Nullify the Law of CriminalNegligence, 23 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1 (1991).
"" See generally IRWIN A. HOROWITZ ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW:
INTEGRATIONS AND APPLICATIONS (2nd ed. 1998); SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S.
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1988).
132 Geoff Kramer et al., PretrialPublicity, Judicial Remedies,
and Jury Bias,
14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 411 (1990).
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unfair in the present instance. For example, Kassin and
Sommers found that jurors were more likely to disregard
evidence ruled as inadmissible by the judge if that
inadmissibility was based on the evidence's unreliability (fair
basis for exclusion) than when the inadmissibility stemmed
from legal, due-process concerns (unfair basis for exclusion).133

C.

Question 3: What Do UninstructedJurorsKnow About
Their NullificationPowersAnd Inclinations?

As noted above, Judge Leventhal, writing for the
majority in the Dougherty ruling, expressed the belief that
jurors knew full well-through informal channels such as the
news media-that they could nullify without fear of reprisal."4
Evidence is scant on this empirical question, but there are
indications that this position is rather too sanguine. For
example, one recent survey of jury-eligible adults in New York
City found that no more that five percent of the population was
cognizant of the jury's nullification powers.135
A related question is whether naive venierpersons
expect to follow the law or their own personal conceptions of
justice, should these prove to be in conflict. Anecdotal and
survey evidence suggests that decreasing confidence in the
legal system, a heightened distrust of lawyers, as well as an
increased cynicism concerning the parties involved in civil
suits, has led to concern that jurors would readily nullify in
such instances.13 The first "Juror Outlook Survey" conducted
by the National Law Journal found that three-quarters of the
respondents said that they would do what they considered to
be the "right thing," no matter how the judge instructed
them.'37 However, a closer look at the survey suggests that
1

Saul M.

Kassin & Samuel R.

Sommers,

Inadmissible Testimony,

Instructionsto Disregard,and the Jury: Substantive Versus ProceduralConsiderations,
23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 1046, 1049 (1997).
"4 Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1137.
135 David C. Brody & Craig Rivera, Examining the Dougherty "All Knowing
Assumption": Do JurorsKnow about Their Nullification Power? 33 CRIM. L. BULL. 151,
151 (1997).
"' Diamond et al., supranote 106, at 252.
137Peter Aronson et al., Jurors:A Biased and Independent Lot, NAT'L L.
J.,

1232

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: 4

when jurors are provided with specific examples, their view is
less provocative and cynical. When asked if they could be fair
and impartial in a case if one of the defendants was an AfricanAmerican, only 1.8% said no, and an additional 4.8% were
unsure.138 When the hypothetical defendant was white, 1.9%
were sure they could not be fair, while 5.2% were unsure."'
Interestingly, jurors were more likely to admit
to prejudice
against gays or lesbians, as well as politicians.140
D.

Question 4: What Would The Impact Be Of Explicitly
Informing JurorsOf A Power Or A Right To Nullify?

The chaos theory advanced in Dougherty raises at
least two related empirical questions. First, advocates and
apologists for jury nullification see what this Article has called
"conventional" jury nullification-avoiding unjust verdicts
under the law-as a proper exercise of juridic authority."' The
interesting empirical question is whether explicitly informing
jurors that they have the power and/or the right to nullify in
this way would facilitate this "proper" form of nullification. The
second question is whether such instructions might have
broader, unintended effects (such as increasing juror biases,
prejudice, use of stereotypes, etc.). Critics of jury nullification
and adherents to the chaos theory fear that the answer to the
latter question is "yes."4 2
With respect to the first question, there is some
experimental evidence that nullification instructions increase
nullification verdicts in cases in which conviction or acquittal
runs counter to jurors' sense of justice. Horowitz examined a
number of hypothetical criminal cases, all of which had clear,
strong evidence for conviction.14 s One was a garden-variety case
Nov. 2, 1998 at Al.
'38 Bob Van Voris, Civil Cases: Jurors Do Not Trust Civil Litigants. Period.,
NAT'L L. J., Nov. 2, 1998 at A24.
139 Id.
140 Id.

141 CONRAD, supra note 20, at 10.
142 Simson, supra note 21, at 492.
143 See generally Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification
Instructions on Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 25 (1985).
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of murder that raised no obvious problems of injustice through
the strict application of the law. The case involved the killing of
a grocery store owner during a robbery, and there was ample
physical and eyewitness evidence of the defendant's guilt.'" A
second case was a (pre-Kevorkian) case of euthanasia. 5 In it, a
nurse hastened the death of a terminally ill cancer patient to
relieve the patient's suffering.'" The facts of this case produced
a highly sympathetic defendant. Here a strict application of the
law (i.e., finding the nurse guilty of first-degree murder) could
be expected to violate at least some jurors' sense of justice.
Jurors were given instructions by the trial judge after
watching the videotapes and before retiring to deliberate. "7
Three sets of judicial instructions were used. One was a set of
standard instructions (SI), drawn from pattern instructions of
Ohio, which made no reference to nullification.1' The second
was drawn from pattern instructions of Maryland, one of just a
few states that has any explicit provision in state law for jury
nullification.1 4 ' These Maryland instructions (MI) indicated
that the law "[i]s not binding upon you" and "[y]ou may accept
or reject it . . . ."" The third set of instructions were the most
expansive on jury nullification powers and were based on
recommendations
made by Jon Van Dyke. 5 ' These
"nullification" instructions (NI) admonished jurors that while
they must give respectful attention to the law, they had the
final authority to decide whether or not to apply the law to the
acts of the defendant. 52 In addition, juries were told that they
were representatives of the community and they should take
into account the sentiments of that community as well as their
conscience. 53 Finally, the third part of these instructions
informed the jurors that while they must respect the law,
"nothing would bar you from acquitting the defendant if you
144 Id. at 26.
145 Id.

...Id. at 27.
'"

Id. at 28.

Horowitz, supra note 143, at 28.
Id. at 26.
110CONRAD, supra note 20, at 88-89.
151Jon M. Van Dyke, The Jury as a PoliticalInstitution, 16 CATHOLIc L. REV.
224, 231 (1970).
152 Horowitz, supra note 143, at 27.
1
141

1" Id. at 28.
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feel the law, as applied to the fact situation before you, would
produce an inequitable or unjust verdict."154 Hence, these NI
instructions asserted both the jury's power and the right to
nullify.
Do juries who receive nullification instructions
function differently than those given standard instructions?
The results of this study suggest that they do. Analysis of
Horowitz's mock juries' deliberations indicated that the
presentation of radical nullification instructions engendered a
different deliberation dynamic.'5 5 Juries who received standard
instruction were more focused on the evidence and the
instruction while those who received strong nullification
instructions focused relatively more on personal experiences
and individual notions of justice.' The latter juries also were
more likely to focus on the defendant's characteristics and
discuss the judge's instructions during the deliberation
process.15 7 It should be noted that juries who received the
Maryland instructions did not differ from those given standard
instructions.
While the expansive nullification instructions
appeared to have "liberated" the juries somewhat from the
evidence, what effect did these instructions have on judgments
of guilt? As shown in Figure 3, Horowitz found that the juries
given the NI instructions were much more likely to be merciful
in the euthanasia case.5 " That is, in the euthanasia case, these
juries were more likely to acquit in the face of the law. Also
note that the type of instruction made no difference in the
murder trial. This is important because it suggests that
nullification instructions do not prompt a general inclination to
acquit, regardless of the content of the case.
This conclusion is underscored by the results involving
a third case, also examined by Horowitz. The case involved a
drunk college-aged male defendant who killed one individual
and severely injured another while driving under the influence
of alcohol. 9 The issue in this case was whether the defendant
Id. at 25.
I'S Id. at 26.
15 Id.
157 Horowitz, supra note 143,
at 26.
I'S Id. at 29.
' ' Id. at 26.
"
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Figure 3: Do Juries Who Receive Nullification Instructions
Function Differently than Those Given Standard Instructions?*
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deliberately ignored warnings that he was not in any condition
to drive. 16 ' As shown in Figure 3, mock juries given the
nullification instructions were more severe in the drunk
driving case, and were also more likely to convict of the most
serious charge (vehicular homicide) in this case. 161 Clearly,,th the
effect of nullification instructions is not restricted to promoting
mercy in cases where a technically-guilty defendant merits
leniency. Such instructions can also prompt harshness in cases
where the defendant is very unsympathetic.
In summary, an explicit nullification instruction did
alter the process and the outcome of Horowitz's mock jury
deliberations. When juries were instructed that they could
determine both facts and law, there was a rationality to their
decision making. That is, they were merciful when the
community would be merciful and the law would not (the
euthanasia scenario) and they were severe when the
community might be expected to be severe, even when the law
made a conviction on the most severe charge rather difficult.
A follow-up study was aimed at providing a
demonstration as to the impact of explicit nullification
information (embedded either in judicial instructions or in
lawyers' arguments) on jury functioning. 6'2 Lawyers are often
able to insinuate nullification sentiments in arguments
without an overt use of that term. 63' Previous research has
suggested that lawyers' nullification arguments can alter the
jury's perception of its role. This second experiment examined
the effects of what happens when a defense lawyer makes a
thinly veiled nullification argument to the jury. It is quite
unlikely that such a defense would go unchallenged. Previous
research had indicated a tendency for unchallenged
nullification arguments to exaggerate jurors' tendencies to
consider non-evidentiary issues in their decision making.'64
160Id.
161

Id.

162 Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions,

Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 460
(1988).
163 Clay S. Conrad, Scapegoatingthe Jury, 7 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 7, 117
(1997).

164

Irwin A. Horowitz & David D. Seguin, The Effects of Bifurcationand Death

Qualification on Assignment of Penalty in Capital Cases, 16 J. OF APP. Soc. PSYCHOL.
2, 167 (1986).
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In the second experiment, 165 mock juries were again

exposed to one of three trials: the drunk driving case used in
the previous study, a modified version of the euthanasia case
(here, with a male nurse), and a case of illegal possession of a
weapon, based on a PBS documentary which demonstrated
jury nullification. 6 ' In addition, mock juries received standard
or nullification instructions from the trial judge and they did or
did not hear a plea for nullification during closing arguments
by the defendant's counsel. 67 Finally, the prosecutor did or did
not challenge the defense counsel's nullification plea. 16 8 The
prosecutor's challenge strongly reminded the juries that they
are asked to follow the law whatever their sentiments. 69
In trials in which the defendant was sympathetic
and/or portrayed as morally upright (i.e., the euthanasia and
illegal possession cases), the judge's instructions that included
a nullification clause or nullification pleas from the defense
counsel resulted in more merciful verdicts. 70 But nullification
information from judge or lawyer did not move the juries in the
direction of mercy for the drunk driving case. 7' This offers
support for Judge Bazelon's hypothesis that a truly dangerous
defendant would not go free under nullification instructions.'

Indeed, the data indicated that jurors had a tendency to judge
the defendant in this trial more harshly than the evidence
warranted, as found in the first study. 73
The impact of challenges to nullification arguments
depressed juries' tendencies to act upon their sentiments.'74 In
the drunk driving case, juries tended to give harsher verdicts
when nullification information went unchallenged.'75 This is a
curious situation: it would appear that if the defense raises the
possibility of nullification when the defendant is perceived as
dangerous, juries will act on that information by bringing in
iCO

Horowitz, supra note 162, at 444.
See Scheflin, supranote 9.

Niedermeier et al., supranote 97, at 339.
Id. at 340.
169 Id. at 459
'

170 Id.
1

Id. at 341.

17 Horowitz, supra note 162, at
447.

Niederneier et al., supranote 97, at 342.
" Id. at 348.

1

175 Id. at

349.
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verdicts more severe than when not given such information.
However, the prosecutor's admonitions to the jury to follow its
prescribed role muted these tendencies.17 6
These two studies suggest then that nullification
instructions from the bench will alter both jury functioning and
verdicts. The verdicts appear to reflect a sense of community
sentiment that is willing to be merciful to morally upright
individuals but is also willing to be more severe than the law in
dealing with less worthy or more dangerous defendants. There
seems to be a predictable calculus that juries employ when in
receipt of nullification information. In addition, when reminded
of their duty to adhere closely to the law as enunciated by the
judge, juries tend to forgo tendencies to nullify. This explains
perhaps why juries in states that have a nullification
instruction (however veiled) and do remind jurors of their duty
to follow the law, do not report instances of "chaos."
Implicit in the chaos theory is the fear that
nullification instructions will have a much wider impact than
merely promoting more merciful verdicts in a handful of
exceptional cases. The fear is that such instructions create a
slippery slope that will encourage jurors to ignore the law with
impunity and to give full rein to their personal prejudices and
biases. To examine these concerns empirically, Niedermeier,
Horowitz, and Kerr conducted four additional studies!"8 In the
first three of these studies, they employed a trial that involved
a morally upright defendant who was technically guilty of the
charged crime.179 However, the crime was committed under
circumstances so extenuating that many jurors would see his
behavior as justified. A doctor was charged with illegally
transfusing a patient with blood unscreened for the HIV virus;
this patient later died of AIDS."' However, the doctor had not
simply been careless, but had acted out of extreme necessity. A
natural disaster, a tornado, had resulted in many injured
persons.18" ' The local hospital was isolated and unable to receive
176 Horowitz, supra note 162, at 450.
177

Jj. Duane, Jury Nullification: The Top Secret Constitutional Right, 22

LITIGATION 6 (1996).
178 See Niedermeier et al., supra note 97.
171 Id. at

316.

180Id.
"'1 Id. at 317.
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emergency supplies, including blood.182 The patient's need for
transfusion was immediate and pressing, and the only blood
available to the doctor was unscreened." Therefore, there were
good reasons to suspect that jurors would feel that convicting
the defendant of this crime would be unjust and a violation of
their sense of fairness.18
As in the previous studies by Horowitz, mock jurors
(or juries) received either standard instructions (SI) or
expansive nullification instructions (NI).' 5 Figures 4, 5, and 6
indicate that mock jurors were more lenient (this time toward
the sympathetic physician) when they received nullification
instructions. But the key objective in these studies was not to
show that nullification instructions could have some direct
impact on verdicts, but rather to see if such instructions
exacerbated the magnitude of other potential biases.l8 6 Thus, in
the study a number of case factors were varied which, ideally,
jurors should ignore, but which research evidence suggests
jurors do not completely ignore, despite the judge's instructions
to the contrary or other normative pressures. Specifically, the
following factors were varied: (a) the defendant's nationality.
(physician was born and trained in the United States versus in
a foreign country), (b) the severity of the penalty prescribed for
conviction
($500
fine versus
twenty-five
years
of
imprisonment), (c) the defendant's professional status (hospital
medical director versus resident), (d) the defendant's remorse
(remorse expressed versus not expressed), and (e) the
defendant's gender (male versus female physician).'8 7
As much prior experimental work would suggest, 8 the
jurors' ratings of the defendant's guilt and/or verdicts were
affected by several of the manipulated, extra-legal factors.
Specifically, the physician/defendant was more likely to be
' (b)
judged guilty if (a) she was a female (rather than a male), 89
the prescribed penalty was only a $500 fine (rather than a
182

Id.
See Niedermeier et al., supra note 97, at 317.

''

Id. at 333-34.

185 Id.

Id. at 318.
,8 Id. at 338-41.
18

See, e.g., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 82 (Norbert L. Kerr &
Robert L Bray eds., 1982); see also Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 131.
18

See Figure 5.
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Figure 4: Effect of Nullification Instructions*
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Figure 5: Effect of Nullification Instructions*
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Figure 6: Effect of Nullification Instructions*
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twenty-five year prison sentence),19 (c) he was a low-status
resident (rather than the hospital medical director), (d) he
failed to express remorse (if a resident), and (e) he expressed
remorse (if the hospital director). But more importantly, in all
but one of these instances of jury bias, hearing NI instructions
did not affect the magnitude of bias.
The one exception to this rule occurred for the
defendant professional status factor. For jurors, the effect of
status (i.e., harsher judgments for the medical resident than
for the hospital medical director) was stronger if the jurors
heard nullification instructions than when they had heard
standard instructions." It is noteworthy that this instruction
effect was not replicated among juries; that is, status did not
have a stronger effect under NI than SI for mock juries, only
for mock jurors. 92
Thus, the first three studies provided very little
evidence that nullification instructions exacerbated jurors'
personal biases in a case where conventional nullification
might be appropriate. In the fourth study, Horowitz posed the
same question for a case in which there was little conflict
between jurors' sense of justice and the demands of the law.
This experiment used trial materials developed for a classic
study by Galen Bodenhausen.'9 3 It was a garden-variety case of
assault, growing out of a bar fight (girl flirts with boy in a bar;
boyfriend gets angry; boy gets assaulted outside bar; boyfriend
is charged; evidence against the boyfriend is circumstantial,
but strong).194 The biasing factor examined was the defendant's
ethnicity; some jurors learned that the defendant was Hispanic
(his name was Carlos Ramierez), the remaining jurors were
told that the defendant was Anglo (Robert Johnson). 95 And, as
in the previous studies, half of the jurors received standard
instructions
(SI) and the rest received nullification instructions
96
1

(NI).

Igo

See Figure 1.

19' Niedermeier et al., supranote 97, at 343.

152 Id.
13 See generally Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in
Social Decision
Making: Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC.

PSYCHOL. 726 (1988).
14 Niedermeier et al., supra note 97, at 340.
19 Id.
19GId. at 341.
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Overall, mock jurors were more likely to judge the
Hispanic defendant as guilty than the Anglo defendant. 9 '
However, this bias was not statistically stronger (or weaker)
among those receiving nullification instructions than among
those receiving standard instructions.198 Once again, there was
little evidence that receipt of nullification instructions
' This
"unleashed" pre-existing juror biases. 99
demonstration
achieved more than replicating a result previously found for
a nullification-relevant case to a nullification-irrelevant case. It
is possible that most or even all of the biasing factors examined
in the first three studies had some indirect impact on jurors'
interpretation of the evidence.
For example, in Niedermeier, Horowitz, and Kerr's
Experiment 2, perhaps the doctor's status affected jurors'
judgment of the doctor's degree of experience, which could, in
turn, have affected jurors' assessment of the reasonableness of
the doctor's actions. Or, in Experiment 3, the doctor's gender
might illogically have affected jurors' judgment of his/her
medical competence, which again could have affected their
judgment of how well justified his/her actions were. One has to
strain mightily, though, to see a way that the defendant's race
in the last experiment could-logically or illogically-influence
jurors' interpretation of the evidence. Rather, this bias seems
more readily interpreted as reflecting reliance on personal
racial or ethnic stereotypes. And it is, in part, reliance on such
personal, extra-legal beliefs which constitutes the "chaos" that
the court predicted would follow receipt of nullification
instructions. But here, there was little evidence of chaotic
effects of such instructions.
Collectively, Niedermeier's studies sought to test
whether explicitly informing jurors of their power to nullify
invites chaos, as feared by some, or prompts jurors to rule
based on their sense of fairness, as hoped for by others.
Nullification instructions seemed to heighten jurors' concerns
about fairness.20 ' Mock jurors reported feeling more free to
197 Id. at 342.

198Id.
199 Niedermeier et al., supra note 97, at 343.
200 Id.
291

at 344.
Id. at 345.
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avail themselves of their notions of fairness. 2 However, except
for one instance in which nullification instructions provoked
individual jurors-not juries-to be more favorable to a higher
status defendant, nullification instructions never interacted
with any manipulation of proscribed information including
defendant gender, defendant remorse, defendant nationality,
extenuating circumstances, or penalty severity.203 It should be
noted that their findings were consistent over four studies that
employed a variety of participant samples (college students,
jury-eligible adults, and adults drawn directly from jury rolls,
both paid and unpaid), and were generally consistent (with the
noted above) across both individuals and
one exception
4
groups.
grUS204

Overall, the data suggests a generally prudent use of
the power to nullify. When the facts of the case engaged jurors'
sense of justice, there are lower conviction rates when they
were in receipt of nullification instructions. This result
replicates previous findings in similar research. We also found
that nullification instructions, particularly when the focus was
the jury, did not affect the magnitude of these biases. 5 Juries
did respond to certain biasing factors, but nullification
instructions did not amplify those biases.
OPEN EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS

IV.

A number of preliminary answers to key empirical
questions relevant to jury nullification have been provided by
the research literature reviewed above. However, for all of the
empirical questions this Article posed, the empirical evidence,
although largely consistent, is fragmentary and inconclusive. It
is clear that more research will be required before we can
confidently assert answers to these questions. Moreover, there
are a number of additional nullification-relevant empirical
questions for which there is practically no research available.
This Article concludes by posing a few of these open questions.

" Id. at 323.

20

Id.

2'4

Niedermeier et al, supra note 97, at 324.

205

Id.
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Just How WidespreadIs Nullification In
ContemporaryAmerican Juries?

A.

There certainly are well-documented instances of
nullification by actual and experimental juries.216 Thus, it is
clear that nullification can and does occur. What is not nearly
so clear is just how common it is. One means of exploring this
question would be through extensive post-trial interviews with
jurors serving in a representative sample of jurisdictions and
cases.
Under What ConditionsIs NullificationMost Likely To
Occur?

B.

For example, are there certain types of cases or
defenses that make nullification more or less likely? How
important is the presence of a nullification advocate ("trigger")
during deliberation for nullification to occur? These questions
could be addressed in experimental jury simulation studies.
Are American JurorsBecoming More Inclined To
Nullify?

C.

For example, are the various "nonconventional" forms
of nullification on the increase, such as "protest verdicts" or
racially-based nullification. If so, what are the events or
sources of information that are encouraging nullification
beliefs, inclinations, and behaviors? Particularly interesting in
this regard is the possibility, highlighted by several prominent
cases (e.g., the 0. J. Simpson case; the Rodney King case), that
racial factors may be playing a more important role in jury
nullification.

2OG

See FINKEL, supra note 10.
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What Do JurorsWho Receive StandardInstructions
Believe About Their Powers And Rights To Nullify?

Standard instructions usually instruct jurors that they
must follow the law and do not mention nullification powers.
Do jurors so instructed still understand the nullification
powers that they possess?
E.

Just What NullificationInstructionsHave What
Impact?

Are there instruction wordings which accurately
communicate powers or rights without inviting excesses or
"chaos"? Are there any kinds of bias which are exacerbated
through strong nullification instructions? In this regard, there
are a number of contrasting interests: (1) Conscious or
intentional acquittal, motivated by goals of fairness or justice
as opposed to unconscious, unintentional acquittal produced by
biased evaluation of evidence or standards of proof; (2) Bias via
belief (e.g., evaluation of evidence) as opposed to bias via
emotion (e.g., sentiment/liking/sympathy). In this latter regard,
practically all of the research showing an effect on verdicts for
nullification instructions involve a sympathetic, likable
defendant (e.g., the nurse charged with euthanasia in
Horowitz, the doctor accused of an illegal transfusion in
Niedermeier) or an unsympathetic, unlikable defendant (e.g.,
the drunk driver of Horowitz). Moreover, most, if not all, of the
biasing factors examined to date may have had exerted their
effects through the interpretation of evidence. Even the biasing
effect of defendant ethnicity observed in the Niedermeier study
could have been the result of such a stereotyped evidentiary
inference (e.g., jurors could infer a disposition for violence from
defendant ethnicity). Would the general pattern of prior
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studies-i.e., nullification instructions not affecting the
magnitude of such biasing effects-also be replicated for biases
that exert their effect through jurors' positive or negative
evaluation of the defendant, or victim, such as that resulting
from racial prejudice?

CONCLUSION

Scholarly opinions on jury nullification reveal many
contradictions. Ours is a system of justice under law, not under
the personal, idiosyncratic judgments of men and women.
However, people recognize that there will be instances in which
justice may be better served by men and women departing
from the strict letter of the law. Many observers believe that
instances of jury nullification are very rare and hence, not a
significant issue or problem. Yet, a number of high profile
cases, many touching on sensitive issues of race, have raised
concerns that there might be a rather large iceberg of jury
nullification beneath the surface of the relatively few, welldocumented cases. Explicit instructions to jurors that they
possess nullification powers (or, more controversially,
nullification rights) may invite arbitrary and widespread
departure from the law with profound consequences. On the
other hand, it is curious to expect jurors to exert a power that
they are routinely told they do not possess.
This Article has suggested that these and other aspects
of the public and scholarly debate on jury nullification require
answers to empirical, behavioral questions. This Article
reviewed the extant empirical literature and identified a
number of suggestive patterns: e.g., explicit instructions
sanctioning conventional jury nullification appear to increase
its incidence, such instructions do not appear to alter juror
verdicts in cases where strict application of the law raises few
problems of perceived injustice in jurors' minds, and such
instructions do not appear to accentuate or exaggerate preexisting juror biases. No matter where one stands on the
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ongoing, non-empirical disagreement about the net benefit or
harm of jury nullification, obtaining clearer, more definitive
answers to these and related empirical questions should do
much for informing and helping to resolve such disagreements.

